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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, a woman six months pregnant and dying of cancer was
admitted into a hospital. Determining that her death was only
days away, doctors suggested that she submit to a caesarean sec-
tion in order to save the life of her unborn child. The woman and
her family opposed the operation, arguing that the baby's chance
of survival was minimal, and that the surgery would subject her to
pain and discomfort in the last hours of her life. A hearing was
held and a court ordered the caesarean section, finding that the
fetus should be given the opportunity to live. The child died two
hours after birth, and the mother suffered intense emotional and
physical pain the last few days of her life.'
In recent years, court rulings nationwide have been chipping
away at a woman's constitutional right to privacy while expanding
the notion of "fetal rights."' 2 By justifying outcomes such as court-
ordered caesarean sections, coerced medical treatment, and invol-
untary detention during pregnancy, courts have indicated that fe-
tal rights are superior to a woman's rights. Commentators have
suggested that judicial recognition of the emerging "fetal rights
doctrine" has resulted in courts treating women as reproductive
vessels. 4
1. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).
2. There have been numerous commentaries regarding the emerging concept of "fetal
rights." See, e.g., Bigge, The Fetal Rights Controversy: A Resurfacing of Sex Discrimina-
tion in the Guise of Fetal Protection, 57 UMKC L. REv. 261 (1989); Gallagher, Prenatal
Invasions & Intervention&: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9
(1987); Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Right" Conflicts With Women's Constitutional
Rights: Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Robertson, The
Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333 (1982); Note, Fetal
Rights" Defining "Person" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 347.
3. In re A.C. 533 A.2d at 617; Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247
Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d
898 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101,
485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
4. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 57.
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The controversy surrounding the conflicting rights of a woman
and her fetus is also present in the employment sector. Here, a
woman's interest in job selection is restricted by employers in the
interest of protecting the health of her unborn or unconceived chil-
dren.' Numerous companies have adopted fetal protection policies
that exclude all fertile women from a workplace where toxic sub-
stances may endanger their reproductive capacities and the health
of their potential offspring.6 The impact of such policies on women
in the workplace has been and will continue to be harsh. An esti-
mated 100,000 jobs already have been closed to women due to re-
productive hazards, and employers may soon use fetal protection
policies to exclude fertile women from as many as twenty million
employment opportunities.
Because fetal protection policies apply only to women, their im-
plementation has resulted in charges of sex discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Five federal
appellate courts have addressed the issue of the legality of such
policies under Title VII. 9 There is, however, disagreement among
the circuits as to the proper Title VII analytical framework for
resolving the fetal protection policy dispute.'o
In a recently decided case, International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc. ," the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a fe-
5. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Cm. L. REv.
1219 (1986); Duncan, Fetal Protection and the Exclusion of Women From the Toxic
Workplace, 18 N.C. CENT. L.J. 67 (1989); Hembacher, Fetal Protection Policies: Reason-
able Protection or Unreasonable Limitation on Female Employees?, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J.
32 (1989); Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal
Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981).
6. Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1979, at A6, col. 5.
7. See Williams, supra note 5, at 647 (at least 100,000 jobs are affected by exclusion-
ary policies); EEOC Report, 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980) (EEOC estimated that as many as
20 million jobs may involve exposure to reproductive hazards); Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) News, JOB SAFETY & HEALTH, Dec. 1978, at 2 (835,000 jobs are
affected by OSHA's standards for exposure to lead); Goldfaber, The Risk of Miscarriage
and Birth Defects Among Women Who Use Video Display Terminals During Pregnancy,
13 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 695 (1988) (use of computers for more than twenty hours per
week poses a threat of miscarriage during the first trimester of pregnancy); BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFFAIRS, PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT 57 (1987) (15 to 20 million jobs in the
United States expose workers to chemicals that may cause reproductive injury).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
9. Grant v. General Motors Corp., No. 89-3478 (6th Cir. July 20, 1990); Interna-
tional Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted,
110 S.Ct. 1522 (1990); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984);
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp.,
692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).
10. See infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
11. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990). More re-
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tal protection policy on a motion for summary judgment. Both the
outcome and reasoning of Johnson Controls are significant because
the case expands the legality of fetal protection policies under Title
VII. UAW's petition for writ of certiorari has been granted, and
the case is currently awaiting consideration by the United States
Supreme Court.
This Note first discusses the traditional legal analysis applied
under Title VII in sex discrimination cases, and how courts have
distorted this analysis when fetal protection policies are involved.
This Note then examines the Johnson Controls decision and dis-
cusses whether its deviation from historical Title VII precedent is
justifiable. Next, this Note attempts to predict whether the
Supreme Court will validate this distorted Title VII framework in
light of established precedent and the right to privacy implications
of fetal protection policies. Finally, this Note proposes alternatives
to fetal protection policies that could effectively promote an em-
ployer's interest in fetal safety and simultaneously recognize a wo-
man's separate interest in employment.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Legal Analysis Under Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 2 Courts traditionally have utilized two analytical
frameworks to resolve Title VII sex discrimination disputes.' 3 The
first of these is the "disparate treatment theory," which involves
claims based on employment policies that are either facially dis-
criminatory or a product of improper motivation. 4  Disparate
treatment discrimination can be justified only if the employer suc-
cessfully asserts the statutory "bona fide occupational qualifica-
cently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the view of the dissenters in Johnson
and held that a fetal protection policy could be justified only by the statutory bona fide
occupational qualification defense. Grant v. General Motors Corp., No. 89-3478 (6th
Cir. July 20, 1990).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
13. See Williams, supra note 5, at 668. Williams discerns three distinct analytical
frameworks under Title VII. A plaintiff can establish a Title VII violation by showing
that the employment policy is either facially discriminatory, a product of discriminatory
intent, or has a disproportionate adverse impact on a protected class. The first two cate-
gories are referred to as disparate treatment cases to which the statutory BFOQ defense
applies. The last category is considered a disparate impact case in which an employer is
entitled to assert the business necessity defense. Id. at 668-73.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (prohibiting classification of employees on the
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin).
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tion" (BFOQ) defense.15 The second framework is the "disparate
impact theory," which is utilized when the claim arises from a
facially neutral employment policy that adversely impacts one
sex.16 The only defense available to the employer under this theory
is the judicially-created "business necessity" defense. 17
1. Disparate Treatment Framework
Disparate treatment discrimination occurs when an employer
treats employees differently because of their sex.' 8 To establish a
prima facie case under this theory, the plaintiff is required to offer
proof of the employer's discriminatory intent. The plaintiff can es-
tablish the requisite intent by demonstrating that the policy is
facially discriminatory or that a facially neutral policy was moti-
vated by a proscribed factor. 9 The burden then shifts to the em-
ployer who is entitled to justify the policy only by asserting the
statutory BFOQ defense.2 0 The BFOQ exception to Title VII per-
mits sex discrimination when sex is a "bona fide occupational qual-
ification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the]
particular business. ' 2 1
To establish a BFOQ defense, an employer must prove two ele-
15. Id § 2000e-2(e).
16. Id § 2000e-2(a)(2) (prohibiting classifications based on neutral factors that tend
to affect adversely a protected class).
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (holding that any
distinction between men and women, no matter how reasonable, is per se discrimination
on the basis of sex, and therefore a violation of Title VII unless justified by the BFOQ
defense). See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employment
policy that prohibited hiring mothers with preschool-aged children but, not similarly sit-
uated fathers, is disparate treatment sex discrimination).
19. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing the
formula for demonstrating a prima facie case of disparate treatment). But see Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978) (noting that the McDonnell formula
"was not intended to be an inflexible rule"); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (noting that "the facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases, and the specification... of the prima facie proof required from a plaintiff is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations").
20. Title VII expressly allows intentional sex discrimination if sex is found to be a
BFOQ:
[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees . . . on the basis of. . . religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
21. Id.
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ments. The first is that the job qualification is one that affects the
very essence of the employer's business.22 This element developed
from the "normal operation" language of the BFOQ exception.
The employer must demonstrate that members of the excluded
class could not perform essential job duties safely and efficiently;
thus, their employment would significantly undermine the em-
ployer's particular business purpose.23
The second required element of proof is that the job qualification
is "reasonably necessary" to the normal operation of the em-
ployer's business. 24 An employer must show that substantially all
excluded class members are unable to perform the job duties safely
and efficiently.25 Alternatively, an employer may show that it is
impossible or highly impractical to evaluate the ability of employ-
ees on an individual basis, and that a blanket exclusion is therefore
necessary.26 Finally, if there is a reasonable alternative that would
serve the employer's business needs equally well, then exclusion of
a protected class is not "necessary. "27
The BFOQ is an extremely narrow exception to Title VII's pro-
hibition of sex discrimination.2 s In limited circumstances, courts
have construed the BFOQ as allowing sex or pregnancy discrimi-
nation because of safety concerns. For example, sex will be a legiti-
mate BFOQ when a woman's employment would jeopardize the
safety of third parties. 29 On the other hand, the fact that a particu-
lar job is too dangerous for a woman does not justify sex discrimi-
nation, because Title VII allows the woman to make that choice
22. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). In Diaz, the
court found that sex was not a BFOQ for the position of a flight attendant. Although the
exclusive presence of women may have a soothing affect on passengers, a policy of hiring
only women as flight attendants is not reasonably necessary to the essence of an airline's
business purpose of safely transporting passengers. Id. at 388. Mere inability of members
of an excluded class to perform peripheral or tangential job duties does not establish a
BFOQ defense. Id.; see also Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (approving the Diaz rationale).
23. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
24. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). See also
Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Dothard, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (approving the
Weeks formulation of the BFOQ defense).
25. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
26. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-36.
27. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
28. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)
(1990). The Supreme Court noted that the EEOC guidelines on sex discrimination reflect
the Court's position that the BFOQ should be interpreted narrowly as to sex. Dothard,
433 U.S. at 334.
29. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-36.
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for herself.30 In either case, the BFOQ defense focuses on a wo-
man's ability to perform the job; accordingly, sex may be a BFOQ
only if a woman's sex directly interferes with her ability to perform
the job safely and efficiently.3'
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court found that sex was
a valid BFOQ for correctional counselor "contact" positions in a
male maximum security prison.32 First, the Court noted that
maintaining security was the essence of a correctional counselor's
job.33 Next, the Court found that because of that particular
prison's environment, there was a real risk that inmates would as-
sault a woman contact guard because she was a woman.34  The
likelihood of such attacks would pose a threat not only to the wo-
man, but also to the basic control of the prison and the protection
of its inmates and other security personnel.3 5 Thus, the court per-
mitted sex discrimination because a woman's ability to maintain
order was directly undermined by her womanhood.36
Similarly, courts have concluded that the BFOQ permits preg-
nancy discrimination in the airline industry on the basis of safety
concerns. Policies requiring the layoff of pregnant airline flight at-
tendants have been upheld as necessary to ensure the safety of pas-
sengers.37 Such discriminatory policies, however, are maintained
only when pregnancy directly interferes with a flight attendant's
ability to perform her job safely and effectively in an emergency
30. Id. at 335.
31. For example, a BFOQ permits exclusion of women as correctional officers when a
"woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-security, unclassified
penitentiary... could be directly reduced by her womanhood." Id.
32. Id. at 336. A "contact" position is one requiring close physical proximity to in-
mates. Id.
33. Id. at 335.
34. Id. The Court explained:
[w]here violence is the order of the day, inmate access to guards is facilitated by
dormitory living arrangements, every institution is understaffed, and a substan-
tial portion of the inmate population is composed of sex offenders mixed at
random with other prisoners, there are few deterrents to inmate assaults on
women custodians.
Id. at 335-36. Further, the record contained evidence of previous inmate attacks on fe-
male workers and visitors in that prison. Id. at 335 n.22.
35. Id. at 336.
36. Id.
37. Some courts have recognized that, at a certain point, pregnancy reduces a wo-
man's physical capacity and agility. This leads to an increased risk of potentially inca-
pacitating medical problems or reduced efficiency. This increased safety risk is sufficient
to establish nonpregnancy as a BFOQ for all flight attendants. See Levin v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649
F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.
1980).
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situation. 38 Hence, the relevant issue when discrimination is based
on safety concerns is whether the risks posed to others are a conse-
quence of a woman's inability to perform the job.
2. Disparate Impact Framework
Disparate impact discrimination involves facially neutral em-
ployment policies that have a disproportionate impact on a pro-
tected group. 39 A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact by presenting statistical data that shows a neutral
policy's disproportionate negative impact on a protected class.4
The burden then shifts to the employer to justify the policy by as-
serting the judicially-created business necessity defense. 4' To in-
voke the business necessity defense, the employer must
demonstrate the existence of a compelling relationship between the
qualification and job performance.42 If the employer establishes a
business necessity defense, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove that there were alternative methods with less discriminatory
impact.43
The United States Supreme Court has established two
frameworks to analyze sex discrimination claims under Title VII.
The characterization of a particular employment policy under
either the disparate treatment or disparate impact framework is
critical to that policy's potential validity or illegality. The BFOQ
defense imposes a more demanding obligation on the employer
than does the more flexible business necessity defense." Therefore,
an employer has a better chance of maintaining a discriminatory
38. Levin, 730 F.2d at 997; Harriss, 649 F.2d at 676; Burwell, 633 F.2d at 370 (al-
lowing pregnancy discrimination only when the disability prevents a woman from per-
forming the essential elements of the job safely and efficiently).
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (establishing the procedure
for evaluating disparate impact sex discrimination cases under Title VII); see also Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
40. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonic, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 (1989). An employer's
motivation for the policy is insignificant in a disparate impact case. Id. at 2119.
41. Id. at 2125.
42. Id. at 2125-26. To assert the business necessity defense, an employer need not
show that the particular employment practice is essential or indispensable to the business,
but must show more than an insubstantial justification. Also, there cannot be an equally
suitable, less discriminatory alternative. Id.; see also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. 444
F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
43. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
44. The BFOQ allows the exclusion of protected groups only when the exclusion is
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business. Williams, supra
note 5, at 670-71. In contrast, the business necessity defense does not require that the
employment policy be essential or indispensable to the business, but rather that it have a
manifest relationship to a legitimate employment goal. Id. at 671-72.
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employment policy under Title VII when he is entitled to assert the
business necessity defense.
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA)4 5 in reaction to a line of Supreme Court decisions that nar-
rowly interpreted sex-based discrimination under Title VII. The
crux of these decisions was that pregnancy classifications are
facially neutral sex discrimination because the distinction is be-
tween pregnant persons and nonpregnant persons, rather than be-
tween men and women.46 As a result, employment policies
classifying on the basis of pregnancy were analyzed under the dis-
parate impact-business necessity framework.47
Dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title
VII, Congress enacted the PDA to make it clear that discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy is facial discrimination on the basis
of sex.48 The PDA provides that the word "sex" in Title VII in-
cludes pregnancy, child birth, or other related medical condi-
tions. 49 Therefore, the effect of the PDA is that distinctions based
on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII and are impermissi-
ble under the traditional disparate treatment theory unless justified
by a BFOQ defense.50
C. Application of Title VII to Fetal Protection Policies
Fetal protection policies exclude fertile women from jobs that
45. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
46. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (citing Gedulig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)) (upholding the exclusion of pregnancy-related benefits from
otherwise comprehensive disability plans).
47. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). The Supreme Court
noted that because pregnancy distinctions were not facially sex-based, there was no per se
violation of Title VII. The Court found, however, that a policy utilizing pregnancy clas-
sifications that has a discriminatory effect on women would be considered a violation of
Title VII. Id. at 143.
48. The PDA reads in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, in-
cluding receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section
2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
49. Id.
50. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
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may present reproductive or fetal hazards. The PDA provides that
discrimination against women on the basis of their capacity to bear
children is sex discrimination. Therefore, any policy that excludes
fertile women but not fertile men can be justified only with a
BFOQ defense.
However, federal courts examining fetal protection policies have
not required the employer to justify its policy with a BFOQ de-
fense. Instead, these courts have elected to utilize a modified ver-
sion of the disparate impact-business necessity analysis.5 '
One of the first courts 52 to consider the legality of fetal protec-
tion policies under Title VII was the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Wright v. Olin Corp. 53 The Wright court acknowledged
that the issue did not fit with precision into any of the developed
Title VII theories, but concluded that a disparate impact-business
necessity analysis was more appropriate in analyzing a sex discrim-
ination claim arising from a fetal protection policy. 54 The court's
analysis failed to address the fact that a fetal protection policy is
facially discriminatory. Rather, the court simply stated that the
BFOQ defense could not be met, and that such a result would be
undesirable in the fetal protection area."
Noting that the business necessity defense had been extended to
embrace safety considerations in other contexts, the court con-
cluded that an employer could establish a business necessity de-
fense based on the need to protect unborn children. 56 The court
went on to define the substantive elements of proof that comprise
the modified business necessity defense as applied to fetal protec-
51. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d
1543, 1554 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982).
52. Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982), also involved a
fetal protection policy. In that case, however, the events in question occurred prior to the
advent of the PDA and the court appropriately applied the disparate impact-business
necessity analysis. Id. at 989. The hospital's practice of dismissing pregnant x-ray tech-
nicians was held to be invalid because there existed less discriminatory ways to achieve
the desired goal. Id. at 994.
53. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at 1185. The Wright court relied on the Supreme Court's position that Title
VII theories should be flexible rather than rigid in permitting the use of a specialized
form of the business necessity defense to a facially discriminatory policy. Id. Further,
the court found the business necessity defense more appropriate because a fetal protection
policy involves motivations and consequences most closely resembling a disparate impact
case. Id. at 1186.
55. Id. at 1185-86 n.21.
56. Id. at 1189-90. The court analogized the employer's interest in fetal safety with
its legally recognized interest in protecting the safety of customers. Id. at 1189; see also
supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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tion policies.57 In essence, an employer must prove by well-estab-
lished medical evidence that the harm feared is greater to fertile
women than fertile men, and that there is no less discriminatory
alternative for avoiding the risk. Once the employer establishes a
business necessity defense, the plaintiff can rebut it by showing the
existence of alternatives that would accomplish the same results
with less discriminatory impact. 58 The Fourth Circuit remanded
the case for decision on the narrow issue of whether a business
necessity was shown.59
Following the lead of the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in
Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital6o also departed from the tradi-
tional Title VII framework by allowing a fetal protection policy to
be justified with a business necessity defense. In Hayes, an x-ray
technician brought a lawsuit against her employer after she was
fired during her pregnancy. 61 The court recognized that a preg-
nancy-based rule could never be neutral, and that firing Hayes be-
cause she was pregnant was therefore facially discriminatory.62
Nevertheless, the court rejected the argument that the only avail-
able defense was a BFOQ, and, in fairness to the hospital, the court
found that a deviation from traditional Title VII analysis was
appropriate.63
Under the Hayes analysis, a policy that applies only to women or
pregnant women creates a presumption of facial discrimination.
The employer can rebut this presumption by showing that the pol-
icy is "neutral" because it equally protects the offspring of all em-
ployees. 64  In defining the proof necessary to rebut this
presumption, the court adopted a version of the business necessity
defense set out in Wright: (1) the employer must produce sufficient
evidence that there is a substantial risk of harm to unborn children
from the employee's exposure, either during pregnancy or while
fertile, to toxic hazards in the workplace, and (2) that the repro-
ductive hazard affects only fertile women, not fertile men.6 5
If the employer satisfies this test, then the burden shifts to the
employee to rebut the business necessity defense by proving that
57. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190-91.
.58. Id. at 1191.
59. Id. at 1187.
60. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
61. Id. at 1546.
62. Id. at 1547-48.
63. Id. at 1548.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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there were less discriminatory alternatives." The court further
stated that even if the employer failed to establish a business neces-
sity, he could still attempt to justify the policy with a BFOQ.67
Noting that a BFOQ requires proof of a correlation between the
fetal protection policy and the fertile female employee's ability to
perform the job, the court concluded that a BFOQ could not be
established, because there existed less discriminatory alternatives.68
The court also found that the employer failed to justify the policy
with a business necessity defense, on the ground that the evidence
of fetal harm was insubstantial.69 Accordingly, the court did not
uphold the fetal protection policy in question. 0
The approaches established in Wright and Hayes form a hybrid
Title VII framework for analyzing fetal protection polices. Ac-
cording to this framework, an employment policy based expressly
on pregnancy may be justified by a business necessity defense, a
defense formerly reserved only for neutral policies.7 1 Despite this
deviation from traditional precedent, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) has endorsed this framework for
analyzing fetal protection policies. 7' Although it recognized fetal
protection as a form of overt discrimination, the EEOC neverthe-
less concluded that the business necessity defense should be applied
flexibly in this narrow class of cases.73 The EEOC observed that
this approach better balanced the interests of the employee, the
66. The Hayes court admitted that its analysis was confusing. Id. at 1554. In detail,
the complete analysis proceeds as follows: (1) if the employer rebuts the presumption of
facial discrimination by meeting the Hayes test, then the policy is deemed neutral and is
considered under the disparate impact theory, Id. at 1552; (2) the employer's business
necessity defense, however, already has been established because he has offered the neces-
sary proof by rebutting the presumption, Id. at 1553; (3) in accordance with traditional
disparate impact analysis, after an employer establishes a business necessity defense, a
plaintiff may still defeat the policy by proving that it is not the least discriminatory alter-
native. Id.
67. Id. at 1549. If the employer fails to rebut the presumption he simultaneously fails
to establish a business necessity defense because the elements of proof for each are identi-
cal. According to the Hayes court, the policy may then be analyzed under the disparate
treatment theory by which the employer is given a second chance to defend the policy
with a BFOQ. Id.
68. Id. at 1553-54. The hospital failed to produce sufficient medical evidence demon-
strating a risk of fetal harm from the employee's radiation exposure. Id. at 1551. Also,
the hospital could have achieved its purpose by monitoring the levels of radiation expo-
sure or temporarily re-assigning the employee. Id. at 1553-54.
69. Id. at 1551.
70. Id. at 1554.
71. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
72. EEOC: Policy Statement on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards Under Title VII, 8
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Empl. Prac. Man. 405:6613 (Oct. 3, 1988)).
73. Id. at 405:6614-15.
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employer, and the unborn child under Title VII. 74
III. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW V. JOHNSON CONTROLS,
INC.
A. Factual Background
The Battery Division of Johnson Controls, Inc. (Johnson) has
maintained a fetal protection policy barring fertile or pregnant wo-
men from working in high lead exposure positions since 1982. 7-
The policy was designed to protect unborn children and their
mothers from the adverse effects of lead exposure. 76 This policy
specifically provides that women with childbearing capacity will be
neither hired for nor allowed to transfer into those jobs in which
lead levels are defined as excessive.77
Before the 1982 policy was instituted, Johnson had a voluntary
fetal protection policy that left with the individual woman the ulti-
mate choice whether to bear the potential risks of lead exposure.78
This policy had been in effect since 1977, and, rather than auto-
matically excluding fertile women, it informed women of the po-
tential risks involved while recommending that fertile women not
work in high risk areas if they were considering a family. Further-
more, this policy provided fertile women the opportunity to trans-
fer to a comparable position if they chose not to bear the potential
risks.79 While this policy was maintained, however, six employees
in high lead exposure positions became pregnant. One woman's
child later recorded an elevated blood level for lead and was diag-
nosed as hyperactive.80 Due to these incidents, Johnson deter-
74. Id. at 405:6615-16.
75. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 874 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
76. Id. at 874. The fetal protection policy applies to work environments in which any
current employee has recorded a blood lead level exceeding 30 ,g/dl, a level considered
unsafe for prospective parents by the Centers for Disease Control and other experts. Id.
at 876 n.7. However, blood lead levels under 50 /zg/100g are considered safe according
to OSHA's lead exposure regulations for all employees. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1025(c)(1) and (k)(i)(D) (1989)).
77. Id. at 876. "The fetal protection policy defines women of childbearing capacity
as: 'All women except those whose inability to bear children is medically documented.'"
Id. n.8.
78. Id. at 876. In 1977, the year that the former policy was implemented, scientific
and medical evidence had not yet conclusively established the risk of lead exposure posed
to the unborn from maternal exposure. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 876-77. Johnson's medical consultant opined that the hyperactivity re-
sulted from maternal exposure to lead during pregnancy. All six of these employees be-
came pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of 30 pg/dl. Id. at 877.
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mined that a voluntary policy was incapable of achieving its
desired goal of fetal safety."'
Johnson implemented its current policy in response to the inef-
fectiveness of the voluntary program and the introduction of con-
clusive medical evidence that lead exposure in utero presents a
substantial health risk to an unborn fetus."2 Prior to updating its
former policy, Johnson actively considered alternatives to the
mandatory exclusion of fertile women."3 Johnson concluded, how-
ever, that no other method adequately would protect the unborn
child from risks associated with excessive lead exposure.8 4
Because the current fetal protection policy excludes only fertile
female employees from high risk areas, several employees chal-
lenged the policy on the grounds that it violated Title VII's prohi-
bition of sex discrimination. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Johnson, finding that the policy was justified
by the business necessity defense.85 UAW appealed and the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case en banc.
B. The Majority Opinion
1. The Business Necessity Defense
Judge Coffey's opinion began by determining the proper legal
analysis to be applied to Johnson's fetal protection program under
Title VII. 8 6 The majority agreed with the Fourth Circuit, Eleventh
Circuit, and EEOC that a business necessity defense may be uti-
81. Id. at 877.
82. Id There was no conclusive evidence, however, that paternal exposure to lead
could result in harm to an unconceived child. Id.
83. Id. at 878.
84. Id. The court noted that a voluntary program was incapable of promoting fetal
safety because six women became pregnant while that policy was in effect. In addition,
neither Johnson nor other battery manufacturers have been able to produce a lead free
battery or to implement a system capable of reducing the lead exposure of fertile female
employees. Excluding only pregnant women was deemed ineffective because of the possi-
bility that lead exposure will occur between conception and the time that the woman
discovers her pregnancy. Further, reduction of blood lead level after removal from a high
risk area takes a significant length of time that would extend into the pregnancy term. Id.
Also, excluding only women who planned to become pregnant was unsuitable due to
the frequency of unplanned pregnancies. Finally, permitting fertile employees to attempt
to maintain a blood lead level below 30 ,g/dl would not protect adequately the unborn
child because an employee's risk of high lead levels is usually greatest immediately after
commencement of work in a high lead environment. Id.
85. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 318
(E.D. Wis. 1988).
86. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 883. Both UAW and Johnson agreed that a substantial risk
of harm to the fetus had been established. The court discussed the exact nature of this
risk as contained in. the record. Id. at 879-83.
1990]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 22
lized in a fetal protection policy case.87 In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the court observed that neither the text of Title VII nor the
Supreme Court interpretations of Title VII mandated that all
forms of facial discrimination be justifiable only with a BFOQ
defense. 8
The Seventh Circuit then adopted the requirements of the busi-
ness necessity defense articulated in Hayes and Wright.8 9 That test
requires the employer to demonstrate that a substantial health risk
to the unborn child exists, and that this risk can be transmitted
only through fertile or pregnant women.' Further, the test allows
the employee to present evidence of less discriminatory alternatives
equally capable of preventing the hazard to the unborn.91 The
court explained that these elements "balance the interests of the
employer, the employee, and the unborn child in a manner consis-
tent with Title VII. ' '92
Next, the Seventh Circuit considered whether Johnson's fetal
protection policy could be sustained under the business necessity
defense.9 3 Noting that both parties agreed that Johnson's work-
place posed a substantial health risk to an unborn child, the court
found that the first element of the business necessity defense was
satisfied. 94
87. Id. at 883-87. For a complete discussion of the reasoning utilized by these courts,
see supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text. However, in a recently decided case, the
Sixth Circuit disagreed with this analysis and held that a fetal protection policy can be
sustained only by a BFOQ. See Grant v. General Motors Corp., No. 89-3478 (6th Cir.
July 20, 1990).
88. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 886.
89. Id. at 885.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 886. The court stated that the "substantial health risk" requirement en-
sured that the policy was not based on "'[m]yths or purely habitual assumptions'" for-
bidden under Title VII. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)). Additionally, the requirement that the risk be confined only to
female employees means that a fetal protection policy recognizes the physical differences
between men and women with respect to human reproduction. Finally, the employee's
option to demonstrate less discriminatory alternatives assures that fetal protection poli-
cies are not unnecessarily restrictive. Id. at 886-87.
93. Id. at 887. The court first clarified the proper allocation of the burden of proof
with respect to the business necessity defense as it applied in summary judgment proceed-
ings. Relying on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct 2115, 2126 (1989), the
court stated that, although an employer must present evidence of a business justification
for his employment practices, the burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff.
Therefore, the relevant inquiry in Johnson was whether UAW, which bore the burden of
persuasion, had presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Johnson's business
necessity defense could not be factually supported. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 886-87.
94. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 888.
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The court next concluded that Johnson also established the sec-
ond element: that the transmission of the hazard to the unborn
child occurs only through women. 95 The court reasoned that the
evidence established that the risk of fetal harm was confined to
fertile female employees, and that findings of paternal transmission
of risk were "speculative and unconvincing. ' 96 Furthermore, the
court observed that Title VII permits distinctions based on the real
sex-based differences between men and women, especially those re-
lating to child birth.97 Therefore, the court concluded that the sex-
based distinction present in Johnson's policy was consistent with
Title VII because the sexes are not similarly situated with respect
to the transmission of fetal risk.98
Finally, the court recognized that Johnson's fetal protection pol-
icy might not have been sustained if UAW had presented evidence
of equally effective alternative practices with a lesser discrimina-
tory impact. 99 The court, however, found that UAW failed to pre-
serve this issue for appeal by not presenting it in its brief.co
Assuming that UAW had preserved this issue for appeal, the court
went on to state that it still would have held that UAW failed to
provide sufficient evidence of the existence of alternatives to rebut
successfully the business necessity defense.101 The court reasoned
that UAW failed to present even one specific alternative to John-
son's fetal protection policy in its briefs and arguments.10 2 In addi-
tion, the court noted that Johnson tried and failed to find a viable
alternative prior to adopting its current fetal protection policy. 103
95. Id. at 889.
96. Id. The only findings of paternal transmission of risk were based on animal stud-
ies. The court stated that animal research evidence is not the type of scientific data on
which to base a reliable conclusion that paternal exposure to lead presents the same dan-
ger to the unborn child as that resulting from maternal exposure. Id.
97. Id. at 890 (citing Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Human Social Servs.,
859 F.2d 1523, 1527-28 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 890-91.
100. Id. at 891. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require " 'an appellant to
present in his brief the issues that he desires to litigate and to support his arguments on
those issues with appropriate judicial authority.' " Id. (quoting Zelazny v. Lyng, 853
F.2d 540, 542 n.l (7th Cir. 1988)); see also FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(4).
101. Id. In resolving this issue, the Seventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court's warn-
ing that - 'Ic]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices, [consequently,] the judiciary should proceed with care before mandating that
an employer must adopt a plaintiff's [proposed alternative employment policy] in re-
sponse to a Title VII suit."' " Id. at 893 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
109 S.Ct. 2115, 2127 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578
(1978))).
102. Id. at 892.
103. Id. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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Finding that UAW failed to present sufficient evidence demon-
strating the absence of the business necessity defense, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of Johnson."
2. The BFOQ Defense
After upholding Johnson's fetal protection policy under the
business necessity defense, the Seventh Circuit went a step further
and found the policy also could be justified as a BFOQ.10 5 In ad-
dressing the BFOQ question, the court relied upon several previ-
ously established principles underlying the application of the
BFOQ defense.
First, the court observed that the BFOQ is a narrow exception to
Title VII's prohibition of employment discrimination."° Next, the
court noted that sex discrimination is permissible only if the es-
sence of a business operation would be undermined by hiring mem-
bers of both sexes.10 7 Further, to rely on the BFOQ defense, the
court recognized that an employer must prove that substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties
of the job involved. '0
Finally, the court discussed the well-established principle that a
BFOQ may not be based on traditional stereotypes of the sexes. 109
The court stated, however, that Title VII recognizes that the
BFOQ may be based on real differences between men and women
in circumstances in which the sexes are not similarly situated.110
Although real physical differences may justify limited distinctions
between men and women, the court concluded that the critical
question is whether, given the reasonable objectives of the em-
104. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 901.
105. Id. at 893.
106. Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977)).
107. Id. at 894 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971))). In Diaz, the
Fifth Circuit rejected gender as a BFOQ for airline ffight attendants because the airlines
proposed justification-to provide a pleasing environment for passengers-was merely
tangential to the airline's primary objective of safe transportation of passengers. Diaz,
442 F.2d at 388.
108. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 894 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)).
109. Id. (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333).
110. Id. at 895 (quoting Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859
F.2d 1523, 1527 (7th Cir. 1988)(en banc)). See also California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286 (1987). This principle has been recognized in the federal con-
stitutional context as well. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464, 469 (1981); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979).
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ployer, the very manhood or very womanhood of the employee un-
dermines his or her capacity to perform a job satisfactorily.'I'
Next, the Seventh Circuit ascertained the validity of Johnson's
fetal protection policy as a BFOQ.' 2 First, the court broadly de-
fined Johnson's business purpose as the manufacture of batteries.
The court stated, however, that Johnson's business is "unique" be-
cause it requires the use of lead, a toxic substance scientifically
known to endanger the offspring of female employees. 3 In order
to respond to problems unique to its battery manufacturing opera-
tion, Johnson properly made it part of its business goal to manufac-
ture batteries in a safe manner." 4  Consequently, the court
concluded that this "safety interest" is part of the "essence" of the
business of a battery manufacturer." 5
The Seventh Circuit then determined whether the fetal protec-
tion policy was "reasonably necessary" to further the objective of
industrial safety." 6 This determination requires that Johnson had
a factual basis for believing that virtually all fertile female employ-
ees would be unable to perform the job duties involved safely and
efficiently." 7 Focusing on the "safety" aspect of this showing, the
court stated that, although Title VII gives a woman the right to
choose whether she wants to accept the risks associated with em-
ployment, the unusual facts of this case justified a departure from
the general maxim. 18
Relying on Dothard for the proposition that the BFOQ permits
sex discrimination on the basis of safety concerns, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reasoned that more was at stake in this case "than an individ-
ual woman's decision to weigh and accept the risks of
employment.""' 9 The court explained that a female employee's de-
cision to work in a high-lead-exposure job poses grave danger to
111. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 894 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336).
112. Id. at 895. The court relied on the method it formulated in Torres to determine
whether sex was a legitimate BFOQ. Id.
113. Id at 896.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 897.
117. Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969))).
118. Id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that it was following the lead of the Supreme
Court in Dothard in departing from general Title VII principles. Dothard, 433 U.S. at
336 (sex will be a legitimate BFOQ when a woman's sex directly interferes with her
ability to perform the job safely, thus creating a risk of harm to third parties).
119. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 897 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335).
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her unborn child, who has no opportunity to avoid these risks. 2°
The court also feared that she somehow may discount the potential
risks to her fetus in her desire to better her family's economic posi-
tion. 2 ' Because "more was at stake" than an individual woman's
safety, the court determined that Dothard supported a conclusion
that Johnson's fetal protection policy constituted a bona fide occu-
pational qualification "reasonably necessary to further industrial
safety."' 22 The court explained that, given Johnson's safety goal of
protecting fetal health, a woman's capacity to perform the job sat-
isfactorily is directly undermined by her sex. 23
C. The Dissents
Judges Cudahy, Posner, Flaum, and Easterbrook dissented from
the majority opinion. All of the dissenters concluded that the com-
plexity of the issues involved in fetal protection policy cases did not
justify the majority's deviation from traditional Title VII analy-
sis. 24 Rather, the BFOQ defense is the only defense that Title VII
allows in what the dissenters saw as a clear case of disparate treat-
ment sex discrimination.
Judge Posner, joined by Judge Cudahy, adopted the BFOQ stan-
dard, but advocated remand for a full trial to determine whether
the evidentiary record sufficiently established that Johnson's fetal
protection policy was a legitimate BFOQ. 25 Judge Posner deter-
mined that Title VII does not outlaw all fetal protection policies,
and that a particular policy may satisfy the stringent requirements
of the BFOQ defense. 26
Judge Posner argued that the "normal operation" of a business
includes both practical and ethical concerns about the effects of an
employer's activities on the public.' 27 Thus, Johnson's concerns
about the potential cost of tort liability arising from fetal injury
and its moral interest in protecting unborn children may be consid-
ered in evaluating the validity its fetal protection policy.'28
120. Id. at 898-99. Medical and scientific evidence documented the extent of fetal
risk due to lead exposure. Id. at 899.
121. Id. at 897.
122. Id. at 898.
123. Id.
124. See Grant v. General Motors Corp., No. 89-3478 (6th Cir. July 20, 1990)
(adopting the Johnson dissenters' position and holding that a fetal protection policy can
only be maintained if justified by the BFOQ defense).
125. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 902 (Posner, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 903 (Posner, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 904 (Posner, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 904-05 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Judge Posner, however,, found that the evidentiary record was
insufficient to establish that Johnson's fetal protection policy was
"reasonably necessary" to the normal operation of its business. 29
First, Johnson failed to document its exposure to tort liability aris-
ing from workplace hazards. Judge Posner argued that if Johnson
could demonstrate that the potential cost of tort liability was sig-
nificant enough to affect the company's normal method of opera-
tion, then infertility would be a legitimate BFOQ.' 30
Second, Johnson failed to demonstrate whether adverse public
relations from endangering the health of children would interfere
with the normal operation of its business. Judge Posner noted that
people who are passionately protective of fetal welfare cannot be
expected "to park their passions at the company gate," and that at
some point this animosity could affect severely the operation of
Johnson's battery plant.13 1
Due to the numerous unanswered questions regarding the extent
of potential tort liability, adverse public relations, the profitability
of a battery manufacturer, and the feasibility of alternatives, Judge
Posner concluded that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on such a sparse record. 3 2 Accordingly, Judge Posner
recommended that the case be remanded for further proceedings to
enable the district court to compile a sufficient evidentiary
record. 133
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judge Flaum, adopted
the BFOQ standard, but concluded that it never could be estab-
lished in a fetal protection policy case.134 First, Judge Easterbrook
stated that ethical and cost concerns regarding the welfare of un-
born children are not included within the "normal operation" of
Johnson's business. 3 5 Judge Easterbrook explained that the focus
of the BFOQ is on the ability of an employee to perform the job,
and fetal safety is an objective unrelated to an employee's ability to
manufacture batteries. 36 Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook noted,
the purpose of Title VII is to allow the individual woman to make
decisions concerning her employment, including decisions about
129. Id. at 905 (Posner, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 905-06 (Posner, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 906-08 (Posner, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 908 (Posner, J., dissenting).
134. Id at 913-14 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 912 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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the welfare of her unborn children.1 7
Next, Judge Easterbrook determined that Johnson's fetal protec-
tion policy was not "reasonably necessary" to the normal opera-
tion of its business. Judge Easterbrook reasoned that Johnson
could not prove that substantially all women would be unable to
manufacture batteries without risk to potential children.' 38 There
was no evidence that all women employees would have children, or
that prenatal injury had ever occurred in Johnson's history.'3 9
Thus, Judge Easterbrook concluded, a speculative fear of prenatal
injury among a minority of women is clearly inadequate to support
a BFOQ.'1 °
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The BFOQ Is the Appropriate Defense
1. Statutory Support
The language of Title VII should be the focal point in determin-
ing the validity of fetal protection policies. Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, '4 unless sex is a "bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of [a] particular business."' 4 2 By enacting the PDA, 4 3
Congress made it clear that discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy is discrimination on the basis of sex. Johnson's fetal protec-
tion policy makes distinctions based on a woman's ability to
become pregnant. Johnson's policy, therefore, is unlawful sex dis-
crimination unless justified as a BFOQ.
2. Supreme Court Precedent
The Seventh Circuit disregarded traditional Title VII theory
when it upheld Johnson's fetal protection policy under a variation
of the business necessity defense. In creating a new framework for
fetal protection policies, the Seventh Circuit relied on the pro-
nouncement of the United States Supreme Court that requires flex-
ible application of established proof patterns in cases that present
137. Id. at 913 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 335 (1971)).
138. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
142. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
143. Id. § 2000e(k); see supra note 48 for full text of amendment.
[Vol. 22
Fetal Protection Policies
novel factual circumstances. 14 The Seventh Circuit noted that this
flexibility is particularly important in fetal protection policy cases,
which balance a woman's interest in economic reward against a
risk of harm to her children. 4 The court concluded, therefore,
that it was appropriate to devise a new analytical framework for
fetal protection policies. 1 "
The Seventh Circuit's reliance on the Supreme Court's mandate
with respect to proof patterns is misplaced. True, the Supreme
Court has stated that its formula for demonstrating a prima facie
case of disparate treatment is flexible and should be adjusted to
particular factual circumstances. 14 7 False, however, is the Seventh
Circuit's notion that the issue in this case is whether the plaintiff
has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. 148 Quite to
the contrary, Johnson's fetal protection policy expressly distin-
guishes on the basis of sex and therefore is a clear case of disparate
treatment sex discrimination. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's
deviation from traditional Title VII frameworks defies United
States Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court's approach in Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart 49 established the norm in sex dis-
crimination cases. In Manhart, female employees were required to
make larger pension fund contributions than their male counter-
parts, ostensibly due to the longer life expectancy of women.150
The Supreme Court determined that such an employment policy,
which uses sex as a basis for disparate treatment, constitutes dis-
crimination because of sex. 151 The Supreme Court consistently has
followed the Manhart approach in sex discrimination cases decided
under Title VII. The crux of these decisions is that a policy distin-
guishing on the basis of sex is disparate treatment discrimination,
unlawful unless supported by a BFOQ. 52 Johnson's fetal protec-
tion policy distinguishes on the basis of pregnancy and therefore is
a clear case of disparate treatment sex discrimination. Hence, the
Seventh Circuit should have found the policy unlawful unless justi-
fied as a BFOQ.
144. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 883 (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
576 (1978)). See supra note 19.
145. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 883.
146. Id. at 886.
147. See supra note 19.
148. See Johnson, 886 F.2d at 911 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
149. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). See supra note 18.
150. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704.
151. Id. at 711.
152. See supra note 18.
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B. Johnson's Policy Is Not a BFOQ
1. "Normal Operation"
Assuming that the United States Supreme Court reviews John-
son Controls consistently with its Title VII precedent, the Court
will have to determine whether Johnson's fetal protection policy is
a BFOQ. The Court's first step will be to define the "normal oper-
ation" of Johnson's "business."' a
The Supreme Court has recognized that the "normal operation"
of a business encompasses ethical, legal, and business concerns
about the effects of an employer's activities on third parties. 54
Thus, fetal safety is a legitimate interest of Johnson in operating its
business. Johnson validly may be concerned with both future tort
liability and adverse public relations arising from fetal injury
within a hazardous workplace. 15
Although fetal safety is a legitimate interest in operating a busi-
ness, the critical question in determining the validity of a BFOQ is
whether this interest is part of the "essence" of the employer's
business purpose. Fetal safety is not an essential element of the
manufacture of batteries in the same sense that maintaining secur-
ity is the essential duty of a security guard.'56 Further, to assert
that the essence of Johnson's business is to manufacture batteries
without fetal risk is distinguishable from asserting that the essence
of an airline's business is to transport passengers without risk.5 7
Rather, as a "cosmetic environment" is peripheral to an airline's
central business, fetal safety is peripheral to a battery manufac-
turer's central business. Accordingly, Johnson's fetal protection
policy fails to satisfy the "normal operation" prong of the BFOQ
defense.
153. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
154. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (the likelihood of attacks
on women contact guards could create a risk of safety to other guards and inmates);
Western Airlines Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 407 (1985) (essence of airline business is
the safe transportation of customers); see also International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 904 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting). The term "nor-
mal operation" should "dispel concern that consideration of all interests other than the
employer's interest in selling a quality product at the lowest possible price is precluded."
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
155. See Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 318, 352 (1987) (Title VII cases historically have not accepted a cost-
based defense as valid); see generally Becker, supra note 5 (discussing how Johnson's
moral justifications are analogous to protective labor legislation sustained by Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in the interest of protecting the next generation).
156. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 22.
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2. "Reasonably Necessary"
The Supreme Court's next inquiry in determining whether there
is a BFOQ will be whether Johnson's fetal protection policy is
"reasonably necessary" to the objective of fetal safety. 5 8 To estab-
lish reasonable necessity, Johnson must demonstrate that all or
substantially all fertile women would be unable to manufacture
batteries without jeopardizing the safety of their potential
offspring. 15 9
Johnson's policy presumes that most fertile women will become
pregnant in the future. Actually, the probability of having a child
varies a great deal among women. Variable factors include age,
birth control method, existing family, and attitudes toward abor-
tion. 110 Most women in an industrial labor force do not become
pregnant. I6' In addition, most of these women will maintain blood
lead levels under 30,ug/dl, the level considered unsafe for prospec-
tive parents by some experts.'62 Furthermore, Johnson's experi-
ence demonstrates that most women who become pregnant with
levels exceeding 30 gg/dl will bear normal children. 63
Although there exists a possibility that some fertile women may
become pregnant and that a subset of their children may suffer, a
fear of fetal injury materializing in a minority of cases is insufficient
158. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
159. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
Alternatively, an employer may demonstrate that it is impractical or impossible to evalu-
ate the ability of fertile women to manufacture batteries without jeopardizing the health
of their potential offspring and therefore a blanket exclusion is necessary. See Western
Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 402, 414-17 (1985). Because this alternate formulation of
the BFOQ is only utilized in cases decided under the Age Discrimination and Employ-
ment Act of 1967, it is not applicable here. However, even if it were applicable, Johnson
could not prove that it is impossible to deal with fertile female employees on an individu-
alized basis. There are numerous methods that Johnson can use to predict which female
employees plan on bearing children, and, consequently, which ones are most likely to
transmit risk to their offspring. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
160. See Becker, supra note 5, at 1232.
161. See id. at 1233. Although approximately 9% of all fertile women become preg-
nant each year, the birth rate for blue collar women over 30 is about 2%. Further, only
one out of 5000 working women aged 45-49 becomes pregnant in a given year. Id.
The record in Johnson does not reveal the birth rate for Johnson's female employees,
but given Johnson's efforts to discourage pregnancy in high lead exposure areas, it is
probably lower.
162. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 913 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (approximately one-third
of the employees exposed to lead at Johnson's plants have higher levels of lead in their
blood).
163. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 877. Among the six employees who became pregnant with
blood lead levels exceeding 30 tig/dl, Johnson reports no birth defects or abnormalities.
One of these children recorded an elevated blood lead level, but this has not produced any
medical problems. Id.
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to sustain a BFOQ.I6 Fertility does not directly interfere with
most women's ability to manufacture batteries in a safe manner.
As traditionally interpreted, the BFOQ will permit discrimination
based on safety concerns only when fertility actually prevents most
women from performing their jobs. Consequently, Johnson's fetal
protection policy excluding all fertile women fails to meet the "rea-
sonably necessary" requirement of a BFOQ and constitutes imper-
missible sex discrimination.
V. IMPACT
A. Right to Privacy
Fetal protection policies raise questions concerning the appro-
priate balance between fetal rights and a woman's constitutional
right to privacy. A woman's right to privacy includes the right to
make childbearing decisions.1 65 Fetal protection policies restrict a
woman's freedom of choice regarding procreation by forcing her to
choose between fertility and employment.1 66 By upholding John-
son's policy under the business necessity defense, the Supreme
Court not only will deviate from its Title VII precedent, but also
will seriously burden the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right.
Although the fourteenth amendment generally does not apply to
the actions of a private employer,1 67 the Supreme Court should not
ignore the significant burden imposed upon a woman's autonomy
when determining the validity of fetal protection policies under Ti-
tle VII.16 8 By distorting traditional Title VII framework to affirm
Johnson's policy, the Supreme Court will indicate that a woman's
interest in employment should yield to the interests of her potential
offspring.
164. See id. at 879-83. Although there is significant medical evidence that fetal expo-
sure to lead results in fetal injury, Johnson has not presented actual evidence that this risk
has or is likely to materialize within its particular business. Id.
165. The right to privacy guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment includes a
woman's childbearing choices. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
166. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 876. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. American Cy-
anamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (five women were sterilized when employer
instituted a policy excluding fertile women from reproductively hazardous jobs).
167. "It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual inva-
sion of individual rights is not the subject matter of this [fourteenth] amendment." Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
168. See Gardner v. National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (com-
paring legitimate governmental interest under the Fourteenth Amendment with an em-
ployer's interest under Title VII).
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Fetal safety should be a national priority, but the costs of fetal
safety should not be borne entirely by women. 169 An employer in-
terested in promoting fetal safety by instituting a policy that
overtly discriminates against women should also bear the burden
of proving that sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification" for
his particular business. In this way, the health of the next genera-
tion is a burden shared between both the employer and the individ-
ual woman, and a woman's separate interest in employment will
not go unrecognized. Hence, right to privacy considerations,
above and beyond Title VII precedent, mandate that fetal protec-
tion policies be upheld only if they meet the requirements of the
more stringent BFOQ defense.
B. Less Discriminatory Alternatives
Johnson's fetal protection policy completely eliminates fetal risk
by not hiring, transferring, or promoting a fertile woman to a high-
lead-exposure job. 170 Zero, however, should not be the only ac-
ceptable level of risk when a woman's constitutional right to pri-
vacy is involved. Furthermore, most fertile female employees will
not become pregnant, and therefore do not pose any risk to fetal
safety. 7 ' Alternatives are available that could protect the interests
of a fetus while recognizing the separate employment interests of a
woman in accordance with Title VII. 172
One possible alternative for Johnson and similarly situated em-
ployers is to narrow exclusionary policies to apply only to pregnant
women or women who plan on becoming pregnant in the future.
In determining who comprises this class, employers can request
reproductive information from current or prospective employees as
a condition of their employment in high risk areas.
Additionally, employers can implement mandatory blood lead
level testing programs and mandatory routine pregnancy tests in
order to identify women who pose fetal risks. These procedures
would be less intrusive on a woman's reproductive freedom and
right to privacy than offering her a choice only between proving
sterility and obtaining a desired job. 173
169. See generally, Becker, supra note 5, at 1221-43. Becker compares the justifica-
tions for distorting Title VII frameworks in upholding fetal protection policies with the
arguments once advanced in favor of sex-specific protective labor legislation. Id.
170. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 876.
171. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
172. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (Title VII's purpose is to allow
the individual woman to make choices concerning employment for herself).
173. See generally, Becker, supra note 5, at 1233-34.
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Another viable alternative would be for employers to educate
their employees regarding the reproductive hazards present in their
respective workplaces. Lack of awareness is one of the primary
problems in this area. 74 Detailed information on the potential ad-
verse effects associated with lead exposure, as well as the probabili-
ties of occurrence in different jobs and sexes, would facilitate a
woman's ability to make an informed choice whether to remain in
a high risk job or pursue other options.
Education, however, is not enough. Employers must also pro-
vide attractive options to women who are at risk. These options
may include permanent or temporary transfers within the com-
pany to jobs comparable in skill and income. Alternatively, em-
ployers could provide career counseling and placement for
different jobs within or without the respective industry.
Limiting fetal protection policies to women who actually pose a
risk of fetal harm, monitoring women with a potential to pose risk,
educating women to make informed decisions about the health of
their potential offspring, and providing attractive options to wo-
men posing a true risk of fetal harm are each reasonable alterna-
tives to onerous blanket exclusions of all fertile women employees.
The increased costs associated with these alternatives will be borne
willingly by employers who truly wish to assume responsibility for
the health of the next generation. More importantly, these alterna-
tives effectively would decrease fetal risks associated with hazard-
ous workplaces while recognizing women's concomitant interests
in employment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The controversy over the legality of fetal protection policies pits
fundamental values against one another: a woman's interest in em-
ployment versus society's interest in protecting the welfare of the
next generation. By distorting Title VII analysis to uphold fetal
protection policies, courts have decided that protecting the future
generation should prevail over a woman's -interest in working.
The Supreme Court should decide that this deviation is unjustifi-
able in light of Title VII precedent, the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, and the right to privacy implications involved. Proper Title
VII analysis requires a finding that fetal protection policies are un-
lawful unless justified by the statutory BFOQ defense. The rigid
174. See generally Butterfield, Study Says Job Hazards Go Unrecognized, Boston
Globe, Nov. 11, 1988, at 1.
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requirements of the BFOQ would allow an employer some latitude
in shaping policies to protect unborn children, but not at the ex-
pense of denying meaningful employment opportunities to women.
By sustaining fetal protection policies only as a BFOQ, the
Supreme Court would recognize the importance of a woman's eco-
nomic role in addition to her natural reproductive role within our
society.
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